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Abstract
This paper examines the dynamic linkages between house price indices, interest rates and stock prices in Malaysia. We 
find mixed evidence of credit-price and wealth effects. For Malaysia as a whole, and for all houses, there is a wealth 
effect. For several specific types of housing (terrace, detached, semi-detached) there is a credit-price effect. We find much 
more evidence of a wealth effect in the developed states of Penang and Selangor. A likely explanation is that in these 
states, compared with the Malaysian average, housing is relatively expensive, income is relatively high and real estate is 
used much more as an investment vehicle by both wealthy Malaysians and foreigners.
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1. Introduction 
Two alternative mechanisms have been proposed in the literature to explain the relationship between 
real estate prices and stock prices (Kapopoulos & Siokis, 2005). The first mechanism is the wealth effect, 
which suggests that households with unanticipated gains in share prices will increase the amount of housing. 
Hence, the stock market will lead the housing market. 
The second mechanism linking housing and stock prices is the credit-price effect, which focuses 
attention on the balance sheet position and collateral value of credit constrained firms. The credit-price effect 
tends to suggest that the housing market will lead the stock market because firms holding commercial real 
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estate will have large unrealized capital gains that will mean that investors will bid up the equity value of the 
firm. However, since firms demand more land and buildings to carry out expanded investment, the price of 
property will also increase, suggesting an upward spiral in both property and stock prices and persistent 
feedback effects. 
Several studies have examined the relationship between real estate prices and stock prices (see eg. 
Chen, 2001; Sutton, 2002; Green, 2002; Sim & Chang, 2006). Most of these studies, however, are for 
developed countries. There are few studies of this sort for developing countries and no studies for Malaysia. 
This paper extends this literature through examining the dynamic linkages between the real estate market and 
stock market for Malaysia.  
One reason for studying house and stock prices in Malaysia is recent interest in movements in these 
asset prices in that country and Asia more generally. A debate exists about whether movements in housing 
prices and stock prices in Asia represent a financial bubble (Bryson & Kamaruddin, 2010; Dyck et al., 2010; Khan 
2010).  The parallel movement in housing and stock prices in Malaysia, in the lead up to, during and 
following the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) has raised the issue of whether one market is driving the other or 
if there are feedback effects between the markets. 
In addition to testing the credit market and wealth effects for Malaysia as a whole, we test credit 
market and wealth effects in the specific locales of Kuala Lumpur, Penang and Selangor. These are the three 
most economically developed regions of Malaysia and areas in which investment and trading activities in 
housing markets are most active. In each case, in addition to using an aggregate price index for all housing, 
we use price indices for specific types of housing; namely, detached, semi-detached, terrace and high-rise 
housing separately. This is important because the strength of the causal relationship between housing and 
stock prices will depend on the extent to which purchasing real estate is considered an investment and 
investors might treat different sorts of housing differently. 
Consistent with the recent literature on this topic, we employ a unit root, cointegration and Granger 
causality testing framework. Because the housing and stock markets have been potentially subject to 
structural breaks, such as the property boom and GFC over the period we examine, we allow for a structural 
break in the unit root and cointegration tests. While the focus is on the relationship between real estate and 
stock markets, employing bivariate analysis is not satisfactory because the relationship between the variables 
might be spurious reflecting common factors (Quan & Titman, 1999; Ibrahim, 2010). This suggests that other 
control variables need to be added. We use the interest rate, which is likely to be a key determinant of an 
investor’s ability to borrow to finance investment in the housing market and stock market (Chen, 2001). The 
availability of credit has been shown to be important in reinforcing boom-bust cycles in asset markets (see 
Oikarinen, 2009).
2. Literature Review
Most of the early studies which examined the relationship between real estate prices and stock prices 
were for the United Kingdom or the United States and focused on correlations between the two assets returns 
(see eg. Ibbotson & Siegel, 1984; Hartzell, 1986; Worzala & Vandell, 1993; Eichholtz & Hartzell, 1996). 
Most of these studies found the correlation between housing and stock returns to be negative. However, none 
of these studies provide any indication as to whether the credit-price or wealth effects are in operation because 
no inference can be made about the direction of causation. More recent studies have applied cointegration and 
Granger causality to time series data to examine the causal interactions between housing and stock prices. 
These studies include Chen (2001) – Taiwan; Sutton (2002) – Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, United 
States, Ireland and Netherlands; Green (2002) – four geographic locales in California with different housing 
prices; Kakes and Van den End (2004) – Netherlands; Kapopoulos and Siokis (2005) – Greece; Sim and 
Chang (2006) – South Korea; Ansari (2006) – United States; and Ibrahim (2010) – Thailand. Overall, Ansari 
(2006) and Sim and Chang (2006) found support for the credit-price effect. Each of the other studies, though, 
found support for the existence of a wealth effect.
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To summarize, to this point most studies which have examined the interaction between house and 
stock prices have focused on developed markets. There are few studies of the dynamic linkages between real
estate and stock markets for developing markets and no studies for Malaysia. This is in spite of recent intense 
interest in movements in housing price and stock price movements in Asia generally and Malaysia more 
specifically. The closest studies to ours for Malaysia are by Hui (2009, 2010) and Mun et al., (2008). Hui 
(2009) and Mun et al. (2008) examined the relationship between property market developments and the real 
economy in Malaysia and found mixed evidence as to the effect of the property market on GDP. Hui (2010) 
examined the long-run and short-run dynamics of regional house prices in the three urban locales of the Klang 
Valley, Penang and Johor. Hui (2010) found evidence of short-run bi-directional causality in all regions, but 
that long-run house price movements in Johor are not Granger caused by house price movements in the Klang 
Valley and Penang.  Neither study, however, considered the relationship between house and stock prices.
3. Data
We use the Malaysian house price index data published by the National Property Information Centre 
(NAPIC) over the period 2000Q1 to 2010Q3. It contains quarterly house price indices for Malaysia as a whole 
as well as for specific locales. The sample period is dictated by data availability.  We use house price indices 
for Malaysia as a whole as well as Kuala Lumpur, Penang and Selangor. In each case we use price indices for 
housing as a whole as well as detached, semi-detached, terrace and high-rise housing. To measure the interest 
rate, we use the base lending rate (BLR) and to measure stock prices, we use the KLCI.  Data on the BLR and 
KLCI are collected from Datastream. All data were transformed to natural logs.
4. Methodology
4.1 Order of Integration of the Variables
Perron (1989) showed that the power to reject the null of a unit root decreases when the stationary 
alternative is true and a structural break is ignored. Hence, to further examine the stationarity properties of the 
data for each series, we employ the lagrange multiplier (LM) unit root test with one structural break proposed 
by Lee and Strazicich (2003). Lee and Strazicich (2003) developed two versions of the LM unit root test with 
one structural break. Using the same nomenclature as employed by Perron (1989), Model A is known as the 
‘crash’ model, and allows for a one-time change in the intercept under the alternative hypothesis. Model C, 
the ‘crash-cum-growth’ model, allows for a shift in the intercept and a change in the trend slope under the 
alternative hypothesis (see Lee & Strazicich, 2003 for more details).
To select the lag length, we used the general to specific procedure proposed by Hall (1994). We set 
the maximum number of lags equal to four and used the 10 per cent asymptotic normal value of 1.645 to 
ascertain the statistical significance of the last first-differenced lagged term. After deciding the optimal lag 
length for each breakpoint, we ascertained the break where the endogenous LM statistic is at a minimum. The 
search is carried out over the trimming region (0.15T, 0.85T), where T is sample size.  Critical values for the 
LM unit root test with one structural break are tabulated in Lee and Strazicich (2003).
4.2 Cointegration and Granger Causality
Once the order of integration of each of the variables is ascertained, we proceed to test for 
cointegration. The existence of cointegration would imply that even though individual series may be non-
stationary, one or more linear combinations of them are stationary.
The long-run multivariate model estimated for each house price index is as follows:
lnHPt =Į + ȕ1lnIRt + ȕ2lnSPt +İt (1)
where lnHP, lnIR and lnSP are the natural logs of house prices, interest rates and stock prices respectively, 
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while the H term is the serially independent random error with mean zero and finite covariance matrix. This 
equation is used to test whether house prices, interest rates and stock prices are cointegrated. Gregory and 
Hansen (1996) proposed three models for testing cointegration where there is a structural break in the 
cointegrating vector. The first contains a level shift (Model C). The second model contains a level shift and 
trend (Model C/T). The third model allows for a regime shift (Model C/S).  In order to test for cointegration 
between HPt, IRt and SPt with structural change, Gregory and Hansen (1996) propose a suite of tests. These 
statistics are the ADF statistic and extensions of the ZD and tZ test statistics: 
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(2)
As the break point,W, is unknown a priori, the model is estimated recursively allowing the break point to vary 
between (0.15T, 0.85T), where T is the sample size. The null hypothesis of no cointegration is examined 
using the three statistics with interest in the smallest values for the three statistics across all break points 
required to reject the null.
Once it is established whether or not there is a long-run relationship between the series, we test 
whether there is Granger causality between interest rates, house prices and stock prices. If interest rates, house 
prices and stock prices are cointegrated, an error correction term is included in the multivariate autoregression 
model (Granger, 1988) The Vector Error Correction Model combines the long-run information as well as their 
short-run dynamics; specifically, the lagged error correction term depicts long-run causality while the k 
lagged first difference variables depict short-run causality. The presence of long-run causality is based on the 
significance of the error-correction coefficient using a t test. We apply F-tests to the k lagged coefficients of 
each variable to make short-run Granger causal inferences.
5. Results
Both Models A and C suggest that interest rates and stock prices are I(1)†. Model A suggests that 15 
of the 20 house price indices are I(0) at 5 per cent or better, while Model C suggests that 14 of the 20 house 
price indices are I(0) at 5 per cent or better. Turning to the location of the breakpoints, in Model C, most of 
the breakpoints in housing prices fall into one of four periods; namely, the recovery period following the 
recession of the early 2000s (2002-2003) – five breaks; the property boom (2005-2006) – five breaks; GFC 
(2007-2008) –four breaks; or the recovery following the GFC (2009-2010) – three breaks. The break in stock 
prices occurs at the height of the global recession of the early 2000s, while the break in interest rates occurred 
in the middle of the property boom.
The results of the Gregory and Hansen (1996) cointegration test with a structural break are presented 
in Table 1.  Each house price index is cointegrated with interest rates and stock prices for at least one model 
(C, C/T, C/S). The ADF* and Z*t statistics give the most number of rejections of the null of no cointegration. 
The Z*Į statistic gives few rejections of the null of no cointegration, but this reflects the weak power of this 
statistic, relative to the other two test statistics.  Given the results in Table 1, we proceed on the basis that each 
house price index is cointegrated with interest rates and stock prices in the presence of a possible regime shift. 
There are a range of break points across the test statistics and models, but almost all coincide with one of the 
four periods mentioned above in which the breaks in the LM unit root test are located. Of the four periods, 
almost half of the breaks are located in the GFC (2007-08) and there are also a large number of breaks in the 
† We skip the tables due to space constraint.
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property boom (2005-06).
Table 2 presents the Granger causality results. In the short-run there is little support for either the 
credit price or wealth effects at the 5 per cent level or better. For the Malaysia and Kuala Lumpur all house 
price indices there is short-run Granger causality running from stock prices to house prices, consistent with a 
wealth effect. For the Selangor semi-detached house price index there is bi-directional short-run Granger 
causality between semi-detached house prices and stock prices, consistent with both wealth and credit-price 
effects. However, for the other 17 house price indices there is short-run independence between house and 
stock prices, indicating market segmentation. This finding is similar to the limited short-run evidence from 
other emerging markets. 
Table 1: Gregory and Hansen Test for Cointegration with a Structural Break
Series Model ADF* k TB Z*t TB Z*Į TB
MYA C -4.9936** 0 08Q1 -5.0715** 08Q1 -21.2371 05Q2
C/T -4.6023 0 08Q1 -4.7254 08Q1 -31.2713 01Q2
C/S -5.1743 0 08Q1 -5.2645* 08Q1 -22.9916 05Q4
MYD C -5.3156** 0 08Q1 -5.3976** 08Q1 -27.5380 05Q4
C/T -5.2406* 0 06Q2 -5.3128** 06Q2 -34.6416 01Q4
C/S -6.2678*** 0 08Q2 -6.4590*** 08Q1 -32.2910 05Q4
MYS C -4.4688 0 08Q1 -4.5270 08Q1 -22.9355 05Q2
C/T -5.4940** 0 03Q3 -5.5606** 03Q3 -36.5022 03Q3
C/S -4.9597 0 08Q2 -5.0198 08Q2 -24.2542 05Q4
MYT C -5.0456** 0 08Q1 -5.1463** 08Q1 -20.8782 05Q2
C/T -4.4795 0 08Q1 -4.5838 08Q1 -31.0002 08Q1
C/S -5.1788 0 08Q1 -5.2900* 08Q1 -22.4025 05Q4
MYH C -4.9847** 1 01Q4 -4.3691 02Q3 -26.7991 02Q3
C/T -5.2806* 0 02Q3 -5.3446** 02Q3 -35.2896 02Q3
C/S -4.9134 1 05Q2 -4.7901 05Q3 -32.1573 05Q3
PGA C -4.4205 1 05Q3 -3.9210 08Q1 -20.8350 05Q2
C/T -6.1008*** 1 02Q1 -5.7476** 02Q3 -37.7898 02Q3
C/S -4.9674 1 06Q1 -4.3023 05Q4 -27.4645 05Q2
PGD C -6.4603*** 0 06Q2 -6.5386*** 06Q2 -43.1084* 06Q2
C/T -6.4868*** 0 06Q2 -6.5654*** 06Q2 -43.3393 06Q2
C/S -6.5012*** 2 06Q1 -7.5868*** 06Q2 -49.6962 06Q2
PGS C -5.5696*** 0 04Q2 -5.6371*** 04Q2 -36.5529 04Q2
C/T -5.6079** 0 04Q2 -5.6759** 04Q2 -36.9374 04Q2
C/S -6.1163*** 0 04Q2 -6.1904*** 04Q2 -41.0216 04Q2
PGT C -4.3407 1 06Q1 -4.3259 08Q1 -21.4452 05Q4
C/T -5.8357*** 0 03Q2 -5.9064*** 03Q2 -39.0998 03Q2
C/S -4.6599 1 06Q1 -4.3426 08Q3 -27.6515 05Q4
PGH C -5.2724** 1 01Q4 -5.1082** 02Q3 -32.0890 02Q3
C/T -6.5386*** 1 02Q4 -6.4386*** 02Q3 -42.6977 02Q3
C/S -5.4157* 1 05Q2 -5.3350* 02Q3 -35.3408 05Q3
SGA C -5.3192** 0 08Q1 -5.4899*** 08Q1 -22.6472 01Q3
C/T -4.7157 0 05Q2 -4.8587 05Q2 -33.9149 05Q2
C/S -5.7382** 0 08Q1 -6.0599*** 08Q1 -24.3660 08Q1
SGD C -5.2552** 2 07Q3 -5.8688*** 08Q1 -38.4933 08Q1
C/T -5.1925* 1 07Q2 -5.4035** 08Q1 -36.9779 08Q1
C/S -5.9955*** 2 07Q3 -6.0433*** 08Q1 -38.0955 08Q1
SGS C -6.1423*** 0 04Q2 -6.2167*** 04Q2 -40.4124 04Q2
C/T -6.9896*** 0 04Q2 -7.0744*** 04Q2 -46.8539 04Q2
C/S -6.2273*** 0 04Q2 -6.3028*** 04Q2 -41.7808 04Q2
SGT C -5.1191** 0 08Q2 -5.1285** 08Q1 -22.8776 01Q2
C/T -4.0475 0 04Q3 -4.2623 05Q1 -29.9018 05Q1
C/S -5.7315** 0 08Q2 -5.8322** 08Q2 -23.4824 08Q1
SGH C -5.3905** 0 04Q4 -5.4559*** 04Q4 -37.2830 04Q4
C/T -5.5008** 0 04Q4 -5.5675** 04Q4 -37.9732 04Q4
264   Hooi Hooi Lean /  Procedia Economics and Finance  1 ( 2012 )  259 – 268 
C/S -7.3134*** 0 08Q4 -7.4020*** 08Q4 -48.6158 08Q4
KLA C -4.8971* 0 08Q2 -4.9564*** 08Q2 -23.6641 05Q3
C/T -8.1688*** 1 07Q3 -7.3206*** 07Q2 -47.9726 07Q2
C/S -5.2635*** 0 08Q2 -5.3273* 08Q2 -24.6673 05Q4
KLD C -5.3015** 0 08Q2 -5.3742** 08Q2 -30.3486 05Q4
C/T -6.4776*** 1 01Q4 -6.5653*** 02Q1 -43.4507 02Q1
C/S -5.7348** 0 08Q2 -5.8416** 08Q2 -29.8144 04Q4
KLS C -5.9825*** 0 04Q2 -6.0550*** 04Q2 -38.1420 04Q2
C/T -7.9953*** 0 05Q4 -8.2714*** 06Q1 -53.3951* 06Q1
C/S -6.7448*** 0 04Q1 -6.8266*** 04Q1 -45.2208 04Q1
KLT C -4.5272 0 08Q1 -4.5980 08Q1 -21.7977 01Q3
C/T -6.9962*** 0 01Q4 -7.0810*** 01Q4 -46.5028 01Q4
C/S -4.7902 0 08Q1 -4.8547 08Q1 -22.9573 05Q3
KLH C -4.9159* 0 08Q3 -4.9755** 08Q3 -31.2775 08Q3
C/T -4.9760 0 08Q3 -5.1661* 09Q1 -33.1551 09Q1
C/S -5.1702 0 08Q2 -5.2329* 08Q2 -33.2839 08Q2
Note: * (**) (***) denotes statistical significance at the 10(5)(1)% level; A=’all houses’; D=’detached houses’; S=’semi-detached houses’; 
T= ‘terrace houses’; H=’high-rise houses’.
Critical values with m = 2 (excluding intercept)
ADF* and Z*t Z*Į
Model 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10%
C -5.44 -4.92 -4.69 -57.01 -46.98 -42.49
C/T -5.80 -5.29 -5.03 -64.77 -53.92 -48.94
C/S -5.97 -5.50 -5.23 -68.21 -58.33 -52.85
Table 2: Granger Causality Results
Series HP IR SP ECT
MYA HP - 1.1076 4.1584** 0.0490***
IR 6.8722*** - 4.3331** -0.0740**
SP 0.0178 3.4303* - 0.1001
MYD HP - 1.6568 0.1827 -0.0864
IR 0.5871 - 1.8665 -0.2185***
SP 0.8974 2.1386 - 0.5556***
MYS HP - 3.3059* 0.0149 -0.1053*
IR 0.9410 - 0.5453 -0.2520***
SP 0.0883 3.0737* - 0.5738**
MYT HP - 0.1201 1.3207 -0.0525
IR 1.7265 - 0.4285 -0.3403***
SP 0.0811 3.1135* - 0.6790**
MYH HP - 0.2465 1.1830 -0.2571**
IR 12.9601*** - 1.9813 -0.3619***
SP 0.0302 4.5791** - 0.6669**
PGA HP - 1.7924 0.6616 -0.0976
IR 12.4415*** - 1.3162 -0.2627***
SP 0.3092 3.6827* - 0.4381**
PGD HP - 4.5080** 0.8781 -0.9302***
IR 1.8215 - 3.2438* -0.1003
SP 0.5180 2.9084* - 0.0901
PGS HP - 0.2480 1.3556 -0.7606***
IR 0.0951 - 2.6401 0.0389
SP 1.4465 4.5913** - 0.4584
PGT HP - 2.8597* 0.4595 -0.0441
IR 8.1795*** - 0.4380 -0.1926***
SP 0.2063 3.6868* - 0.3045*
PGH HP - 0.2332 2.8037* -0.3624***
IR 6.7250*** - 3.9950** -0.1830***
SP 0.0000 3.8777** - 0.2934**
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SGA HP - 0.0091 1.6366 -0.1805**
IR 1.7359 - 0.4343 -0.4013***
SP 0.6813 3.0588* - 0.6590*
SGD HP - 0.0704 0.8154 -0.3140***
IR 9.7786*** - 2.668 -0.1106**
SP 0.028 2.451 - 0.2101
SGS HP - 2.8452 8.2377** -0.8199***
IR 10.9348** - 3.0424 -0.2842**
SP 24.2688*** 9.4508** - 0.3221
SGT HP - 0.2595 2.3862 -0.1669**
IR 0.0480 - 0.2843 -0.4392***
SP 1.8477 2.0905 - 0.5695*
SGH HP - 0.1495 1.9341 -0.6491***
IR 4.3160** - 3.2927* -0.1098
SP 0.0185 3.2816* - 0.3462
KLA HP - 0.9444 7.6577** -0.0932
IR 3.2828 - 3.1153 -0.2838***
SP 4.3228 4.2688 - 0.5596**
KLD HP - 0.4106 0.0429 -0.2951***
IR 0.3000 - 1.1231 -0.0996**
SP 1.797 1.5521 - 0.2627**
KLS HP - 0.6232 0.1472 -0.4884***
IR 3.4433* - 0.9872 -0.1493***
SP 3.3334* 3.3517* - 0.2891*
KLT HP - 1.8656 1.6484 -0.1003
IR 2.8730* - 0.8406 -0.1953***
SP 0.1551 2.2874 - 0.3947**
KLH HP - 0.1018 0.4641 -0.1462
IR 6.1438** - 0.0010 -0.3326**
SP 0.2198 4.0073** - 0.8544**
Notes: * (**) *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. A=’all houses’; D=’detached houses’; S=’semi-
detached houses’; T= ‘terrace houses’; H=’high-rise houses’; HP = house prices; IR = base lending rate; SP = Kuala Lumpur Composite 
Index
Turning to the long-run, there is mixed evidence of the wealth and credit-price effects. For the all 
house price indices, for Malaysia as a whole and Selangor there is a wealth effect, while for Kuala Lumpur 
and Penang there is a credit-price effect. For the detached house price indices, for Malaysia as a whole there is 
a credit-price effect, for Penang and Selangor there is a wealth effect and for Kuala Lumpur there is a 
feedback effect. The feedback effect is consistent with both wealth effect and credit-price effects and can be a 
potential explanation of spiraling movements in both prices.  For the semi-detached house price indices, for 
Malaysia as a whole there is a credit-price effect, but for each of Kuala Lumpur, Penang and Selangor there is 
a wealth effect. For the terrace house price indices, for Malaysia as a whole and Kuala Lumpur there is a 
credit-price effect, for Selangor there is a wealth effect and for Penang house and stock prices are 
independent, meaning the two markets are segmented in the long-run. Finally, for high-rise house price 
indices, for Malaysia as a whole and Penang there are feedback effects, for Selangor there is a wealth effect 
and for Kuala Lumpur there is a credit price effect. Overall, of the 20 house price indices, nine exhibit 
evidence of a wealth effect, seven exhibit evidence of a credit-price effect, three exhibit feedback effects and 
one exhibits independence between house and stock prices. 
We find more evidence of a credit price effect than most other studies of this sort, including studies 
for other developing economies (see eg. Ibrahim, 2010). For Malaysia as a whole, for all housing evidence is 
consistent with a wealth effect, but for most types of housing (detached, semi-detached and terrace), house 
price increases are creating wealth that is driving the stock market. These results for Malaysia as a whole 
reflect the fact that while the government has pursued policies to increase share ownership among 
Bumiputras, shares are generally not widely held. If shareholdings are not widespread, the effect of an 
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increase in share prices on consumption will be relatively small. The most popular forms of housing for 
Malaysia’s middle classes are terraces, followed by semi-detached and detached housing. The results for these 
specific types of housing for Malaysia as a whole are consistent with ‘Mum’ and ‘Dad’ investors leveraging 
of higher house prices to invest in the stock market.
For Penang and Selangor there is more evidence of stock market wealth driving housing wealth than 
for Malaysia as a whole. This finding reflects the fact that real estate in these states could be considered as an 
investment vehicle to a greater extent than in economically less developed states. Specifically, both states are 
among the most popular for foreigners investing in the Malaysian property market. In addition, housing in 
both states are relatively expensive compared with the rest of Malaysia. As noted by Green (2002) more 
expensive markets are prime candidates for the wealth effect to be large. Moreover, in Penang in particular, 
changes in demand for housing are expected to be reflected in changes in prices, rather than changes in 
quantity, since supply of land is more inelastic, which will accentuate a wealth effect.
Prices in the high-end high-rise condominium market are likely to exhibit a wealth effect. The high-
rise house price indices for Malaysia as a whole, as well as Penang and Selangor exhibit wealth effects.  There 
is a lot of foreign investment in the high-end condominium market in Penang and Selangor. As high-end 
condominiums are expensive, this is consistent with a likely wealth effect; specifically, those who purchase 
high-end condominiums are typically in the middle-to-high income bracket who are also likely to own shares. 
The surge in stock markets, not only in Malaysia, but elsewhere in Asia, such as Hong Kong, the Middle East, 
Indonesia and Singapore prior to the GFC resulted in unanticipated gains, which were spent in part on the 
luxury condominium market in the Klang Valley and Penang. When the GFC hit stock markets this also 
generated a fall in prices for luxury condominiums; at the height of the GFC foreign interest in the high-end 
condominium market dipped leading to a 30 per cent drop in prices (Omar, 2011). For Malaysia as a whole 
and for Penang there are also feedback effects where interaction between the two asset markets leads to a 
spiraling upturn (or downturn) in both prices which are self reinforcing. Chen (2001) argues that such self-
reinforcing movement in house and stock prices explain why exogenous shocks generate persistent effects. 
These feedback effects for Malaysia also help to explain why the drop in stock prices and high-end 
condominium prices were so deep in the GFC. 
6. Conclusion
This study has examined the dynamic linkages between house prices and stock prices in Malaysia. 
There is mixed evidence of credit-price and wealth effects. For Malaysia as a whole, while for all houses there 
is a wealth effect, for several specific types of housing (terrace, detached, semi-detached) Granger causality 
runs from house prices to stock prices. One is more likely to expect a wealth effect in specific locales where 
there is high income pockets and relatively expensive real estate (Green, 2002). Consistent with this 
perspective, there is much more evidence of a wealth effect in the developed regions of Penang and Selangor. 
In these states, compared with the Malaysian average, housing is relatively expensive, income is relatively
high and real estate is used much more as an investment vehicle by both wealthy Malaysians and foreigners 
who are more likely to leverage of shares.
The finding for the all house price index for Malaysia as a whole and for several house price indices 
in Penang and Selangor that stock prices lead house prices, suggests that the stock market is crucial for 
stability in the real estate market. This result is similar to Ibrahim’s (2010) findings for Thailand. He argued 
that the burst in the Thai housing market following the Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998 was a result of 
declining stock markets. The result is also consistent with the findings in Mun et al., (2008) that the stock 
market Granger causes economic growth in Malaysia. The policy implication of finding evidence of a wealth 
effect for the all house price index for Malaysia and for several house price indices in Penang and Selangor is 
that policymakers should implement policies to promote stability in the stock market. Following the Asian 
financial crisis, the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange and Securities Commission put in place a series of 
standards designed to improve transparency, disclosure, accounting and corporate governance, but these 
267 Hooi Hooi Lean /  Procedia Economics and Finance  1 ( 2012 )  259 – 268 
standards still fall short of international standards (Shimomoto, 1999). For some specific housing indices 
(Malaysia high-rise, Penang high-rise and Kuala Lumpur detached) there has been a positive (negative) 
wealth effect, reinforced by a positive (negative) credit-price effect, in the Malaysian asset market. As a result 
the real estate and stock markets have had strong feedback effects on each other. In the GFC, when stock 
prices fell, a negative wealth effect had a large negative impact on the high-rise condominium market and our 
results suggest that this in turn, had a negative feedback to the stock market creating a downward spiral in 
prices.
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